

# Common Criteria Quick Reference Card



**For Common Criteria (CC) edition 3.1 R3 (2009-07).** *(PDF version has direct links to standards)*

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1. Security Functional Requirements (SFRs)

CLASS	FAMILY	COMPONENT [2]	ELEMENTS/OPERATIONS/NOTES [2]
FAU Security audit <a href="#">IDTI</a>	ARP	Security audit automatic response	1 Security alarms 1 act
	GEN	Security audit data generation	1 Audit data generation 2 User identity association 1
	SAA	Security audit analysis	1 Potential violation analysis 2 Profile based anomaly detection 3 Simple attack heuristics -4 Complex attack heuristics 1, 2 evt, rules 1 profile, 2, 3 con 1 violation-evt, 2 activity-inf, 3 1 penetration-evt, indicator-evt, 2 inf, 3
	SAR	Security audit review	1 Audit review 2 Restricted audit review 3 Selectable audit review 1 usr, inf, 2 1 1 methods, criteria
	SEL	Security audit event selection	1 Selective audit 1 att, att
	STG	Security audit event storage	1 Protected audit trails storage -2 Guarantees of audit data availability 3 Action in case of possible audit data loss -4 Prevention of audit data loss 1, 2 ability 1, 2 ability, 3 metric, con 1 act, lim 1 act, act
	FCO Communication <a href="#">IDTI</a>	NRO	Non-repudiation of origin
NRR		Non-repudiation of receipt	1 Selective proof of receipt -2 Enforced proof of receipt 1 inf-type, role(3rdParty), 2 att, inf-fields, 3 role(3rdParty), lim 1 inf-type, 2 att, inf-fields, 3 role(3rdParty), lim
FCS Cryptographic support <a href="#">IDTI</a>	CKM	Cryptographic key management	1 Cryptographic key generation 2 Cryptographic key distribution 3 Cryptographic key access 4 Cryptographic key destruction 1 algor., keysize, standard 1 keysize, standard 1 type, method, standard 1 method, standard
	COP	Cryptographic opr.	1 Cryptographic operation 1 opr, algor., keysize, standard
FDP User Data Protection <a href="#">IDTI</a>	ACC	Access control policy	1 Subset access control -2 Complete access control 1 pol, sub/obj/opr 1 pol, sub/obj/opr, 2
	ACF	Access control functions	1 Security attribute based access control 1 pol, sub/obj/att, 2 gov.-rules, 3 auth.-rules, 4 deny-rules
	DAU	Data authentication	1 Basic Data Authentication 2 Data Authentication with Identity of Guarantor 1 obj/inf-types, 2 sub 1 obj/inf-types, 2 sub
	ETC	Export from the TOE	1 Export of user data without security att 2 Export of user data with security attributes 1 pol, 2 1 pol, 2, 3, 4 rules
	IFC	Information flow control policy	1 Subset information flow control -2 Complete information flow control 1 sub/inf, 2
	IFF	Information flow control functions	1 Simple security attributes -2 Hierarchical security attributes 1 sub/inf/att, 2 flow-rule, 3 add.-rule, 4 auth-rules, 5 deny-rules 1 sub/inf/att, 2 opr-relations, 3 rules, 4 auth-rules, 5 deny-rules, 6
			3 Limited illicit information flows -4 Partial elimination of illicit information flows 5 No illicit information flows 6 Illicit information flow monitoring 1 flow-types, capacity 1 pol, flow-types, capacity, 2 flow-types 1 pol -name
			1 Pol -name
	ITC	Import from outside of the TOE	1 Import of user data without security att. 2 Import of user data with security attributes 1 pol, 2, 3 rules 1 pol, 2, 3, 4, 5 rules
	ITT	Internal TOE transfer	1 Basic internal transfer protection -2 Transmission separation by a attribute 3 Integrity monitoring -4 Attribute-based integrity monitoring 1 pol, evt 1 access-pol, evt, 2 att 1 pol, err, 2 act 1 pol, err, att, 2 act
	RIP	Residual information protection	1 Subset residual information protection -2 Full residual information protection 1 act, obj 2 act
	ROL	Rollback	1 Basic rollback -2 Advanced rollback 1 pol, opr, 2 lim 1 pol, opr, 2 lim
	SDI	Stored data integrity	1 Stored data integrity monitoring -2 Stored data integrity monitoring and action 1 err, att 1 err, att, 2 act
	UCT	Inter-TSF user data confidentiality transfer protection	1 Basic data exchange confidentiality 1 pol, act
	UIT	Inter-TSF user data integrity transfer protection	1 Data exchange integrity 2 Source data exchange recovery -3 Destination data exchange recovery 1 pol, act, act 2 act 1 pol, err 1 pol, err
FIA Identification and authentication <a href="#">IDTI</a>	AFL	Authentication failures	1 Authentication failure handling 1 num/range, evt, 2 evt, act
	ATD	User att. definition	1 User attribute definition 1 att
	SOS	Specification of secrets	1 Verification of secrets 2 TSF Generation of secrets 1 metric 1 metric, 2 fct
	UAU	User authentication	1 Timing of authentication -2 User authentication before any action 3 Unforgeable authentication 4 Single-use authentication mechanisms 5 Multiple authentication mechanisms 6 Re-authenticating 7 Protected authentication feedback 1 act, 2 1 1 act, 2 act 1 mechanism 1 mechanism, 2 rules 1 con 1 feedback
			1 act, 2
			1
			1
UID	User identification	1 Timing of identification -2 User identification before any action 1 1 act, 2	
USB	User-subject binding	1 User-subject binding 1 att, 2 association-rules, 3 change-rules	

Conventions: [IDTI](#) Dependency table; "-" hierarchical class; SFR element operation colours (selection, assignment).

Abbreviations: act (action), att (attribute), con (condition), err (error), evt (event), inf (information), lim (limitation), num (number), obj (object), opr (operation), pol (policy), sub (subject), u/s (user/subject).

CLASS	FAMILY	COMPONENT [2]	ELEMENTS/OPERATIONS/NOTES [2]	
<b>FMT</b> Security management [DT]	MOF	Management of functions in TSF	1 Management of security functions behaviour <u>1</u> act, <b>fct, roles</b>	
	MSA	Management of security attributes	1 Management of security attributes <u>2</u> Secure security attributes <u>3</u> Static attribute initialisation <u>4</u> Security attribute value inheritance <u>1</u> pol, <b>act(opr), att, role</b> <u>1</u> att <u>1</u> pol, <b>act(opr), 2 role</b> <u>1</u> value-setting-rules	
			1 Management of TSF data <u>2</u> Management of limits on TSF data <u>3</u> Secure TSF data <u>1</u> act(opr), <b>data, roles</b> <u>1</u> data, <b>roles, 2 act</b> <u>1</u> data	
			1 Revocation <u>1</u> Revocation <u>1</u> att, <b>groups(resources), roles, 2 rules</b>	
	SAE	Security attribute expiration	1 Time-limited authorisation <u>1</u> att, <b>roles, 2 act</b>	
	SMF	Specification of Management fct.	1 Specification of Management Functions <u>1</u> fct	
	SMR	Security management roles	1 Security roles <u>-2</u> Restrictions on security roles <u>3</u> Assuming roles <u>1</u> roles, <u>2</u> <u>1</u> roles, <u>2</u> , <u>3</u> con <u>1</u> roles	
ANO			Anonymity	1 Anonymity <u>-2</u> Anonymity without soliciting information <u>1</u> u/s, sub/opr/obj <u>1</u> u/s, sub/opr/obj, <u>2</u> service, sub
				PSE
UNL	Unlinkability	1 Unlinkability <u>1</u> u/s, opr, <b>cause(relations)</b>		
UNO	Unobservability	1 Unobservability <u>-2</u> All location of information impacting unobservability <u>3</u> Unobservability without soliciting information <u>4</u> Authorised user observability <u>1</u> u/s, opr, obj, <b>usr/sub</b> <u>1</u> inf, <u>2</u> con <u>1</u> service, sub, inf <u>1</u> usr, resource/service		
		FLS	Fail secure	1 Failure with preservation of secure state <u>1</u> failure types
<b>FPT</b> Protection of the TOE [DT]	ITA	Availability of exported TSF data	1 Inter-TSF availability within a defined availability metric <u>1</u> data-types, <b>metric, con</b>	
	ITC	Confidentiality of exported TSF data	1 Inter-TSF confidentiality during transmission <u>1</u>	
	ITI	Integrity of exported TSF data	1 Inter-TSF detection of modification <u>-2</u> Inter-TSF detection and correction of modification <u>1</u> metric, <u>2</u> act <u>1</u> metric, <u>2</u> act, <u>3</u> mod-type	
			1 Basic internal TSF data transfer protection <u>-2</u> TSF data transfer separation <u>3</u> TSF data integrity monitoring <u>1</u> opr <u>1</u> opr, <u>2</u> <u>1</u> evt(err), <u>2</u> act	
	PHP	TSF physical protection	1 Passive detection of physical attack <u>-2</u> Notification of physical attack <u>3</u> Resistance to physical attack <u>1</u> , <u>2</u> <u>1</u> , <u>2</u> , <u>3</u> device/element, <b>usr/role</b> <u>1</u> scenarios, device/element	
			1 Manual recovery <u>-2</u> Automated recovery <u>--3</u> Automated recovery without undue loss <u>4</u> Function recovery <u>1</u> failures <u>1</u> failures, <u>2</u> failures <u>1</u> failures, <u>2</u> failures, <u>3</u> quantification, <u>4</u> <u>1</u> fct/scenarios	
			1 Replay detection <u>1</u> Replay detection <u>1</u> entities, <u>2</u> act	
	SSP	State synchrony protocol	1 Simple trusted acknowledgement <u>-2</u> Mutual trusted acknowledgement <u>1</u>	
			1, <u>2</u>	
	STM	Time stamps	1 Reliable time stamps <u>1</u>	
	TDC	Inter-TSF TSF data consistency	1 Inter-TSF basic TSF data consistency <u>1</u> data-types, <u>2</u> rules	
	TEE	Testing of external entities	1 Testing of external entities <u>1</u> evt(con), <b>properties 2 act</b>	
	TRC	Internal TOE TSF data replication consistency	1 Internal TSF consistency <u>1</u> , <u>2</u> fct	
	TST	TSF self test	1 TSF testing <u>1</u> evt(con), <b>TSF(parts), 2 TSF-data(parts), 3 TSF(parts)</b>	
<b>FRU</b> Resource Utilisation [DT]	FLT	Fault tolerance	1 Degraded fault tolerance <u>-2</u> Limited fault tolerance <u>1</u> TOE-capabilities, <b>failure-types</b> <u>1</u> failure-types	
	PRS	Priority of service	1 Limited priority of service <u>-2</u> Full priority of service <u>1</u> , <u>2</u> resources <u>1</u> , <u>2</u>	
			1 Maximum quotas <u>-2</u> Minimum and maximum quotas <u>1</u> resources, <b>u/s, time</b> <u>1</u> resources, <b>u/s, time, 2 resources, u/s, time</b>	
<b>FTA</b> TOE access [DT]	LSA	Limitation on scope of selectable attributes	1 Limitation on scope of selectable attributes <u>1</u> session-att, <b>att</b>	
	MCS	Limitation on multiple concurrent sessions	1 Basic limitation on multiple concurrent sessions <u>-2</u> Per user attribute limitation on multiple concurrent sessions <u>1</u> rules, <u>2</u> default-lim	
			1 TSF-i initiated session locking <u>2</u> User-initiated locking <u>3</u> TSF-i initiated termination <u>4</u> User-initiated termination <u>1</u> time-interval, <u>2</u> evt <u>1</u> , <u>2</u> evt <u>1</u> time-interval <u>1</u>	
	TAB	TOE access banners	1 Default TOE access banners <u>1</u>	
	TAH	TOE access history	1 TOE access history <u>1</u> succ-display, <u>2</u> unsucc-display, <u>3</u>	
	TSE	TOE session establish.	1 TOE session establishment <u>1</u> att	
	<b>FTP</b> Trusted path/ channel	ITC	Inter-TSF trusted channel	1, <u>2</u> TSF/product, <u>3</u> fct
TRP		Trusted path	1 rem/local, <b>evt(violation), 2 rem/local-usr,</b> <u>3</u> auth(service)	

**Conventions:** [DT] Dependency table; "-" hierarchical class; SFR element operation colours (selection, assignment).

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2. Security Assurance Requirements (SARs)

CLASS	FAMILY	COMPONENT [3]	WU/CEM [4]	NOTES/BSI [5]	EAL	
ASE ST evaluation <u>[DT]</u>	INT	ST introduction	<u>1</u> ST introduction	<u>1</u> (ST content), <u>2</u> (ST reference), <u>3</u> (TOE ref id), <u>4</u> (TOE ref not misleading), <u>5</u> (sec features), <u>6</u> (TOE type), <u>7</u> (type not misleading), <u>8</u> (non-TOE), <u>9</u> (physical scope), <u>10</u> (logical scope), <u>11</u> (consistency)	<u>1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10, 11</u>	1-7
	CCL	Conformance claims	<u>1</u> Conformance claims	<u>1</u> (CC version), <u>2</u> ([2] extension), <u>3</u> ([3] extension), <u>4</u> (extended SFR), <u>5</u> (extended SAR), <u>6</u> (PP claim), <u>7</u> (package claim), <u>8</u> (package names), <u>9</u> (PP TOE type), <u>10</u> (PP SPD), <u>11</u> (PP sec objectives), <u>12</u> (PP SFRs)	<u>1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10, 11, 12</u>	1-7
	SPD	Security problem definition	<u>1</u> Security problem definition	<u>1</u> (threats), <u>2</u> (threat description), <u>3</u> (OSPs), <u>4</u> (OE assumptions)	<u>1, 2, 3, 4</u>	2-7
	OBJ	Security objectives	<u>1</u> Security objectives for the OE <u>2</u> Security objectives	<u>1</u> (OE sec objectives) <u>1</u> (TOE+OE sec objectives), <u>2</u> (TOE obj. to threats/OSPs), <u>3</u> (OE obj. to OSPs+assumptions), <u>4</u> (counter threats), <u>5</u> (enforce OSPs), <u>6</u> (OE assumptions)	<u>1</u> <u>1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6</u>	1 2-7
	ECD	Extended components definition	<u>1</u> Extended components definition	<u>1</u> (non-ext. req in [2]/[3]), <u>2</u> (ext. req. covered), <u>3</u> (CC taxonomy), <u>4</u> (dependencies), <u>5</u> ([2] comp model), <u>6</u> ([2] family model), <u>7</u> ([2] class model), <u>8</u> ([3] comp model), <u>9</u> (SAR method), <u>10</u> ([3] family model), <u>11</u> ([3] class model), <u>12</u> (measurable elements), <u>13</u> (no existing comp)	<u>1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10, 11, 12, 13</u>	1-7
	REQ	Security requirements	<u>1</u> State d security requirements <u>2</u> Derived security requirements	<u>1</u> (SFRs), <u>2</u> (SARs), <u>3</u> (terms defined), <u>4</u> (operations), <u>5</u> (assignments), <u>6</u> (iterations), <u>7</u> (selections), <u>8</u> (refinements), <u>9</u> (dependencies), <u>10</u> (consistency) <u>1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10</u> (trace to objective), <u>11</u> (meet objectives), <u>12</u> (SAR justification), <u>13</u>	<u>1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10</u> 1 (1-1), 2 (1-2), 3 (1-3), 4 (1-4), 5 (1-5), 6 (1-6), 7 (1-7), 8 (1-8), 9 (1-9), <u>10, 11, 12, 13</u> (1-10)	1 2-7
	TSS	TOE summary specification	<u>1</u> TOE summary specification (TSS) <u>2</u> TSS with architect. design summary	<u>1</u> (TOE meets SFRs), <u>2</u> (consistency with overview/description) <u>1, 2, 3, 4</u>	<u>1, 2</u> n/a	1-7
ALC Life-cycle <u>[DT]</u>	CMC	CM capabilities	<u>1</u> Labelling of the TOE	<u>1</u> (unique label), <u>2</u> (consistent references)	<u>1, 2</u>	1
			<u>2</u> Use of a CM system	<u>1, 2, 3</u> (unique config ids), <u>4</u> (consistent ids)	1 (1-1), 2 (1-2), <u>3, 4</u>	2
			<u>3</u> Authorisation controls	<u>1, 2, 3, 4, 5</u> (CM access), <u>6</u> (CM plan), <u>7</u> (CM use), <u>8</u> (config maintenance), <u>9</u> (CM records), <u>10</u> (CM operation)	1 (1-1), 2 (1-2), 3 (2-3), 4 (2-4), <u>5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10</u>	3
			<u>4</u> Production support, acceptance procedures and automation	<u>1, 2, 3, 4, 5</u> (CM access control), <u>6</u> (automated production), <u>7</u> (effective production), <u>8, 9, 10</u> (config modification), <u>11, 12, 13</u>	1 (1-1), 2 (1-2), 3 (2-3), 4 (2-4), <u>5, 6, 7, 8</u> (3-6), 9 (3-7), <u>10, 11</u> (3-8), 12 (3-9), 13 (3-10)	4+5
			<u>5</u> Advanced support	<u>1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10, 11, 12, 13, 14, 15, 16, 17, 18, 19, 20</u>	n/a	6+7
	CMS	CM scope	<u>1</u> TOE CM coverage	<u>1</u> (config list TOE, evidence by SAR), <u>2</u> (unique config items)	<u>1, 2</u>	1
			<u>2</u> Parts of the TOE CM coverage	<u>1</u> (config list TOE, parts, evidence by SAR), <u>2, 3</u> (item developer)	<u>1, 2</u> (1-2), <u>3</u>	2
			<u>3</u> Implementation representation CM coverage	<u>1</u> (config list TOE, parts, impl., evidence by SAR), <u>2, 3</u>	<u>1, 2</u> (1-2), 3 (2-3)	3
			<u>4</u> Problem tracking CM coverage	<u>1</u> (config list TOE, parts, impl., evidence by SAR, docu), <u>2, 3</u>	<u>1, 2</u> (1-2), 3 (2-3)	4
			<u>5</u> Development tools CM coverage	<u>1</u> (config list TOE, parts, impl., evidence by SAR, docu, tools), <u>2, 3</u>	<u>1, 2</u> (1-2), 3 (2-3)	5-7
	DEL	Delivery	<u>1</u> Delivery procedures	<u>1</u> (versions distribution), <u>2</u> (procedure use)	<u>1, 2</u>	2-7
	DVS	Development security	<u>1</u> Identification of security measures	<u>1</u> (environment), <u>2</u> (policy sufficiency), <u>3</u> (measure application)	<u>1, 2, 3</u>	3-5
			<u>2</u> Sufficiency of security measures	<u>1, 2, 3, 4</u>	n/a	6+7
<u>1</u> Basic flaw remediation			<u>1</u> (track reported flaws), <u>2</u> (flaw description), <u>3</u> (flaw status identification), <u>4</u> (flaw correction identification), <u>5</u> (user information)	<u>1, 2, 3, 4, 5</u>		
<u>2</u> Flaw reporting procedures			<u>1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6</u> (correction requests), <u>7</u> (correction help), <u>8</u> (remediation support), <u>9</u> (no adverse), <u>10</u> (flaw correction)	1 (1-1), 2 (1-2), 3 (1-3), 4 (1-4), 5 (1-5), <u>6, 7, 8, 9, 10</u>		
FLR	Flaw remediation	<u>3</u> Systematic flaw remediation	<u>1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6</u> (developer receive reports), <u>7</u> (reg. user receives report timely), <u>8</u> (autom. distribution), <u>9</u> (ensure flaw correction), <u>10, 11, 12, 13</u> (guidance to register), <u>14</u> (guidance for reports)	1 (1-1), 2 (1-2), 3 (1-3), 4 (1-4), 5 (1-5), <u>6, 7, 8, 9, 10</u> (2-8), 11 (2-9), 12 (2-10), <u>13, 14</u>		
		<u>1</u> Developer defined life-cycle model	<u>1</u> (cover maintenance), <u>2</u> (positive contribution)	<u>1, 2</u>	3-6	
LCD	Life-cycle definition	<u>2</u> Measurable life-cycle model	<u>1, 2, 3</u>	n/a	7	
		<u>1</u> Well-defined development tools	<u>1</u> (well-defined tools), <u>2</u> (impl. statements/conventions), <u>3</u> (impl. options)	<u>1, 2, 3</u>	4	
TAT	Tools and techniques	<u>2</u> Compliance with implementation standards	<u>1, 2, 3, 4</u> (application around aspects)	1 (1-1), 2 (1-2), 3 (1-3), <u>4</u>	5	
		<u>3</u> Compliance with implementation standards - all parts	<u>1, 2, 3, 4</u>	n/a	6+7	

Conventions: [DT] Dependency table; WU task colours (check, examine, other).

Abbreviations: beh. (behaviour), enf. (enforcing), ext. (extended), IF (interface), impl (implementation), interf. (interfering), mod. (module), pen (penetration), pot. (potential), req (requirement), s/e (supporting/enforcing), subs. (subsystem), sup. (supporting).

CLASS	FAMILY	COMPONENT [3]	WU/CEM [4]	NOTES/BSI [5]	EAL	
ADV Development <a href="#">[DT]</a>	ARC Security Architecture	1	Security architecture description	<a href="#">1</a> (SFR-enf. abstractions), <a href="#">2</a> (sec. domains), <a href="#">3</a> (init process), <a href="#">4</a> (TSF self-protection), <a href="#">5</a> (SFRs not bypassed)	<a href="#">1, 2, 3, 4, 5</a>	2-7
		1	Basic functional specification	<a href="#">1</a> (purpose s/e TSFI), <a href="#">2</a> (method of use s/e TSFI), <a href="#">3</a> (parameter s/e TSFI), <a href="#">4</a> (non-interf. IF), <a href="#">5</a> (SFR link to TSFI), <a href="#">6</a> (complete SFR instantiation), <a href="#">7</a> (accurate SFR instantiation)	<a href="#">1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7</a>	1
	FSP Functional specification	2	Security-enforcing functional specification	<a href="#">1</a> (TSF fully repr.), <a href="#">2</a> (TSFI purpose), <a href="#">3</a> (method of use), <a href="#">4</a> (parameter ident.), <a href="#">5</a> (parameter desc.), <a href="#">6</a> (SFR enf. TSFI), <a href="#">7</a> (error msg.), <a href="#">8, 9, 10</a>	<a href="#">1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8</a> (1-5), <a href="#">9</a> (1-6), <a href="#">10</a> (1-7)	2
		3	Functional specification with complete summary	<a href="#">1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7</a> (invocation error msg.), <a href="#">8</a> (s/e actions), <a href="#">9, 10, 11</a>	<a href="#">1</a> (2-1), <a href="#">2</a> (2-2), <a href="#">3</a> (2-3), <a href="#">4</a> (2-4), <a href="#">5</a> (2-5), <a href="#">6</a> (2-6), <a href="#">7, 8, 9</a> (1-5), <a href="#">10</a> (1-6), <a href="#">11</a> (1-7)	3
		4	Complete functional specification	<a href="#">1, 2, 3, 4</a> (TSFI complete), <a href="#">5, 6, 7</a> (all actions), <a href="#">8</a> (invocation error msg), <a href="#">9</a> (error msg. meaning), <a href="#">10, 11, 12</a>	<a href="#">1</a> (2-1), <a href="#">2</a> (2-2), <a href="#">3</a> (2-3), <a href="#">4, 5</a> (2-4), <a href="#">6</a> (2-5), <a href="#">7, 8, 9, 10</a> (1-5), <a href="#">11</a> (1-6), <a href="#">12</a> (1-7)	4
		5	Complete semi-formal functional specification with additional error information	<a href="#">1, 2</a> (semiformal style), <a href="#">3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10, 11</a> (non-invocation error msg), <a href="#">12</a> (non-invocation error msg rational), <a href="#">13, 14, 15</a>	<a href="#">1</a> (2-1), <a href="#">2, 3</a> (2-2), <a href="#">4</a> (2-3), <a href="#">5</a> (4-4), <a href="#">6</a> (2-4), <a href="#">7</a> (2-5), <a href="#">8</a> (4-7), <a href="#">9</a> (4-8), <a href="#">10</a> (4-9), <a href="#">11, 12, 13</a> (1-5), <a href="#">14</a> (1-6), <a href="#">15</a> (1-7)	5+6
		6	Complete semi-formal functional specification with a additional formal specification	n/a	n/a	7
	IMP Implementation representation	1	Implementation representation of the TSF	<a href="#">1</a> (TSF generation), <a href="#">2</a> (form used by developers), <a href="#">3</a> (mapping design/impl sample)	<a href="#">1, 2, 3</a>	4+5
		2	Complete mapping of the impl. representation of the TSF	n/a	n/a	6+7
	INT TSF internals	1	Well-structured subset of TSF internals	<a href="#">1, 2, 3, 4, 5</a>	n/a	
		2	Well-structured internals	<a href="#">1, 2, 3, 4</a>	<a href="#">1, 2, 3, 4</a>	5
		3	Minimally complex internals	n/a	n/a	6+7
	SPM Security policy modelling	1	Formal TOE security policy model	n/a	n/a	6+7
	TDS TOE design	1	Basic design	<a href="#">1</a> (subs. structure), <a href="#">2</a> (all subs. id.), <a href="#">3</a> (sup./non-interf. subs.), <a href="#">4</a> (compl. SFR enf. subs.), <a href="#">5</a> (subs. interactions), <a href="#">6</a> (TSFI mapping to subs.), <a href="#">7</a> (SFR covered by design), <a href="#">8</a> (SFR instantiation)	<a href="#">1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8</a>	2
2		Architectural design	<a href="#">1, 2, 3</a> (non-interf. subs.), <a href="#">4</a> (SFR enf. beh.), <a href="#">5</a> (SFR sup./non-interf. beh.), <a href="#">6</a> (SFR sup. subs.), <a href="#">7</a> (subs. interactions), <a href="#">8, 9, 10</a>	<a href="#">1</a> (1-1), <a href="#">2</a> (1-2), <a href="#">3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8</a> (1-6), <a href="#">9</a> (1-7), <a href="#">10</a> (1-8)	3	
3		Basic modular design	<a href="#">1</a> (subs. structure), <a href="#">2</a> (TSF mod.), <a href="#">3, 4</a> (TSF subs. roles in SFR enforce.), <a href="#">5</a> (SFR non-interf. subs.), <a href="#">6</a> (subs. interactions), <a href="#">7</a> (complete mod./subs. map), <a href="#">8</a> (accurate mod./subs. map), <a href="#">9</a> (SFR enf. mod. purpose+relationships), <a href="#">10</a> (SFR related params), <a href="#">11</a> (SFR sup./non-interf. mod. categorized), <a href="#">12</a> (sup./non-interf. mod. purposes), <a href="#">13</a> (sup./non-interf. mod. interact), <a href="#">14</a> (TSFI map to mod.), <a href="#">15, 16</a>	<a href="#">1, 2, 3</a> (1-2), <a href="#">4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10, 11, 12, 13, 14, 15</a> (1-7), <a href="#">16</a> (1-8)	4	
4		Semiformal modular design	<a href="#">1, 2, 3</a> (TSF mod. id.), <a href="#">4, 5</a> (semif. notation def/ref), <a href="#">6, 7, 8, 9, 10, 11</a> (s/e mod. purpose+relationships), <a href="#">12</a> (s/e mod. params), <a href="#">13</a> (non-interf. mod. categorized), <a href="#">14</a> (non-interf. mod. purposes), <a href="#">15</a> (non-interf. mod. interactions), <a href="#">16, 17, 18</a>	<a href="#">1</a> (3-1), <a href="#">2</a> (3-2), <a href="#">3, 4</a> (1-2), <a href="#">5, 6</a> (3-4), <a href="#">7</a> (3-5), <a href="#">8</a> (3-6), <a href="#">9</a> (3-7), <a href="#">10</a> (3-8), <a href="#">11, 12, 13, 14, 15, 16</a> (3-14), <a href="#">17</a> (1-7), <a href="#">18</a> (1-8)	5	
5		Complete semiformal modular design	n/a	n/a	6	
6		Complete semiformal modular design with formal high-level design present.	n/a	n/a	7	
AGD Guidance <a href="#">[DT]</a>	OPE Operational user guidance	1	Operational user guidance	<a href="#">1</a> (functions and privileges), <a href="#">2</a> (IF use), <a href="#">3</a> (parameter), <a href="#">4</a> (events), <a href="#">5</a> (operation modes), <a href="#">6</a> (measures/role), <a href="#">7</a> (clear), <a href="#">8</a> (reasonable)	<a href="#">1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8</a>	1-7
	PRE Preparative procedures	1	Preparative procedures	<a href="#">1</a> (delivery procedure), <a href="#">2</a> (installation steps), <a href="#">3</a> (preparation)	<a href="#">1, 2, 3</a>	1-7

Conventions: [\[DT\]](#) Dependency table; WU task colours (check, examine, other).

Abbreviations: beh. (behaviour), enf. (enforcing), ext. (extended), IF (interface), impl (implementation), interf. (interfering), mod. (module), pen (penetration), pot. (potential), req (requirement), s/e (supporting/enforcing), subs. (subsystem), sup. (supporting).

CLASS	FAMILY	COMPONENT [3]	WU/CEM [4]	NOTES/BSI [5]	EAL		
ATE Tests <a href="#">[DT]</a>	COV Coverage	1 2	Evidence of coverage Analysis of coverage	1 (test docu/TSFI correspondence) 1 (test docu/TSFI correspondence), 2 (test plan IF approach demonstrative), 3 (test adequate), 4 (func. spec interface and test docu complete)	1 1, 2, 3, 4	2 3-5	
		3	Rigorous analysis of coverage	n/a	n/a	6+7	
		DPT Depth	1	Testing: basic design	1 (test docu incl. TSF beh.+interactions), 2 (test approach demo. beh.), 3 (test approach demo. subs. interactions), 4 (all subsystem beh.+interactions tested)	1, 2, 3, 4	3+4
	2		Testing: security enforcing modules	1, 2, 3, 4 (SFR-enf. mod. IF in test docu), 5 (test approach demo. SFR-enf. mod. IF beh), 6, 7 (all SFR-enf. mod. IF tested)	1 (1-1), 2 (1-2), 3 (1-3), 4, 5, 6 (1-4), 7		
	3		Testing: modular design	1, 2, 3, 4 (TSF mod. IF in test docu), 5 (test approach demo. TSF mod. IF beh), 6, 7 (all TSF mod. IF tested)	1 (1-1), 2 (1-2), 3 (1-3), 4, 5, 6 (1-4), 7	5+6	
	4		Testing: implementation representation	n/a	n/a	7	
	FUN Functional tests	1	Functional testing	1 (testplan+results incl.), 2 (test scenarios), 3 (ST/test-config consistent), 4 (order dependencies), 5 (expected test results), 6 (actual/expected test results consistent), 7 (developer test effort)	1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7	2-5	
			Ordered functional testing	n/a	n/a	6+7	
		IND Independent testing	1	Independent testing - conformance	1 (config consistent with ST), 2 (proper installation), 3 (create test subset), 4 (produce test subset docu), 5 (run test subset), 6 (record test info), 7 (actual/expected test results), 8 (report test effort)	1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8	1
	2		Independent testing - sample	1, 2, 3 (use of resources), 4 (run dev. test samples), 5 (act/exp test results), 6, 7, 8, 9, 10, 11 (evaluator test effort)	1 (1-1), 2 (1-2), 3, 4, 5, 6 (1-3), 7 (1-4), 8 (1-5), 9 (1-6), 10 (1-7), 11	2-6	
3	Independent testing - complete	n/a	n/a	n/a	7		
AVA Vulnerability <a href="#">[DT]</a>	VAN Vulnerability analysis	1	Vulnerability survey	1 (config consistent with ST), 2 (proper installation), 3 (public pot. vulnerabilities), 4 (vulnerabilities test candidates), 5 (create pen. tests), 6 (produce pen. test docu), 7 (run pen. tests), 8 (record test results), 9 (evaluator pen. test effort), 10 (results wrt. "basic" attack), 11 (report vulnerabilities)	1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10, 11	1	
		2	Vulnerability analysis	1, 2, 3 (public pot. vulnerabilities), 4 (search pot. vulnerabilities), 5, 6 (create search-based pen tests), 7, 8, 9, 10, 11, 12	1 (1-1), 2 (1-2), 3, 4, 5 (1-4), 6, 7 (1-6), 8 (1-7), 9 (1-8), 10 (1-9), 11 (1-10), 12 (1-11)	2+3	
		3	Focused vulnerability analysis	1, 2, 3 (public pot. vulnerabilities), 4 (search pot. vulnerabilities), 5, 6 (create search-based pen tests), 7, 8, 9, 10, 11 (results wrt. "enhanced" attack), 12	1 (1-1), 2 (1-2), 3, 4, 5 (1-4), 6, 7 (1-6), 8 (1-7), 9 (1-8), 10 (1-9), 11, 12 (1-11)	4	
		4	Methodical vulnerability analysis	1, 2, 3, 4 (analyse pot. vulnerabilities), 5, 6 (create search-based pen tests), 7, 8, 9, 10, 11 (results wrt. "moderate" attack), 12	1 (1-1), 2 (1-2), 3 (3-3), 4, 5 (1-4), 6, 7 (1-6), 8 (1-7), 9 (1-8), 10 (1-9), 11, 12 (1-11)	5	
		5	Advanced methodical vulnerability analysis	n/a	n/a	n/a	6+7
ACO Composition <a href="#">[DT]</a>	COR Composition rationale	1	Composition rationale	1, 2, 3	n/a	n/a	
		DEV Development evidence	1	Functional Description			1, 2, 3
			2	Basic evidence of design			1, 2, 3, 4, 5
	REL Reliance of dependent component	3	Detailed evidence of design	1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7			
		1	Basic reliance information	1, 2, 3, 4			
	CTT Composed TOE testing	2	Reliance information	1, 2, 3, 4, 5			
1		Interface testing	1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8				
		2	Rigorous interface testing	1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10, 11			
VUL Composition vulnerability analysis	1	Composition vulnerability review	1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8				
		Composition vulnerability analysis	1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9				
		Enhanced-Basic Composition vulnerability analysis	1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9				

Conventions: [\[DT\]](#) Dependency table; WU task colours (check, examine, other).

Abbreviations: beh. (behaviour), enf. (enforcing), ext. (extended), IF (interface), impl (implementation), interf. (interfering), mod. (module), pen (penetration), pot. (potential), req (requirement), s/e (supporting/enforcing), subs. (subsystem), sup. (supporting).

3. Evaluation Assurance Levels (EALs)

EAL7	INT1	CCL1	SPD1	OBJ2	ECD1	REQ2	TSS1	CMC5	CMS5	DEL1	DVS2	(FLR)	LCD2	TAT3	ARC1	FSP6	IMP2	INT3	SPM1	TDS6	OPE1	PRE1	COV3	DPT4	FUN2	IND3	VAN5	EAL7
EAL6	INT1	CCL1	SPD1	OBJ2	ECD1	REQ2	TSS1	CMC5	CMS5	DEL1	DVS2		LCD1	TAT3	ARC1	FSP5	IMP2	INT3	SPM1	TDS5	OPE1	PRE1	COV3	DPT3	FUN2	IND2	VAN5	EAL6
EAL5	INT1	CCL1	SPD1	OBJ2	ECD1	REQ2	TSS1	CMC4	CMS5	DEL1	DVS1		LCD1	TAT2	ARC1	FSP5	IMP1	INT2		TDS4	OPE1	PRE1	COV2	DPT3	FUN1	IND2	VAN4	EAL5
EAL4	INT1	CCL1	SPD1	OBJ2	ECD1	REQ2	TSS1	CMC4	CMS4	DEL1	DVS1		LCD1	TAT1	ARC1	FSP4	IMP1			TDS3	OPE1	PRE1	COV2	DPT1	FUN1	IND2	VAN3	EAL4
EAL3	INT1	CCL1	SPD1	OBJ2	ECD1	REQ2	TSS1	CMC3	CMS3	DEL1	DVS1		LCD1		ARC1	FSP3				TDS2	OPE1	PRE1	COV2	DPT1	FUN1	IND2	VAN2	EAL3
EAL2	INT1	CCL1	SPD1	OBJ2	ECD1	REQ2	TSS1	CMC2	CMS2	DEL1					ARC1	FSP2				TDS1	OPE1	PRE1	COV1		FUN1	IND2	VAN2	EAL2
EAL1	INT1	CCL1		OBJ1	ECD1	REQ1	TSS1	CMC1	CMS1							FSP1					OPE1	PRE1				IND1	VAN1	EAL1
ASE								ALC				ADV						AGD		ATE			AVA					

#### 4. References

### Document overview:

- [1] [CC part 1 \(2009-07\)](#) Common Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluation, part1: Introduction and general model
- [2] [CC part 2 \(2009-07\)](#) Common Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluation, part2: Security functional components
- [3] [CC part 3 \(2009-07\)](#) Common Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluation, part3: Security assurance components
- [4] [CEM \(2009-07\)](#) Common Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluation, Evaluation methodology
- [5] [Guide \(2010-07\)](#) Guidelines for Evaluation Reports according to Common Criteria Version 3.1, BSI.

### Upcoming events

[ICCC \(International Common Criteria Conference\), Paris, 18-20 September 2012](#)

